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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant, ,
i

v.

Case No. 970275-CA
Priority No. 2

JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD,
Defendants/Appellees. ]

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

INTRODUCTION
The State asks this Court to address the issue of judicial
notice of an alleged legislative fact, not raised at trial, not
raised in the appellate briefs, not argued before this Court, but
raised, for the first time, in their Petition for Rehearing.
Specifically, the State urges this Court, which it labels as too
urban to understand, "to recognize that the archaeologist used the
term of art, "midden," in a particular way when he testified where
he found the human remains•"

(State's Petition, p. 5.)

The State, in unequivocal violation of Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 24(11), appends approximately 25 pages of excerpts
of diverse articles about such unknown places as Alkali Ridge amd
Pecos, in an attempt to buttress its new argument that this Court
should use judicial notice, of a term of art, used in a particular
way, to reverse a finding of the Trial Court and to reverse this
Court's own finding that "... we otherwise conclude that this type
of fact is not one normally subject to judicial notice ..." State
v. Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 8, Addendum A of the State's
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Petition.
The State, as it did in its briefing, makes factual statements
not supported by the record.
The State disagrees with this Court as to the sole issue for
review.
In violation of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11,
and without any attempt under Utah R. App. P. Rule 11(h) to correct
or modify the record, the State attempts to argue outside the
record through the use of excerpts from am unofficial transcript
of the oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASK
The Statement of the Case is set forth accurately by this
Court in its unanimous opinion, affirming the ruling of the Trial
Court,

attached

as Addendum

A

to

the

State's

Petition

for

Rehearing, State v. Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah App. 1998),
pages 4-5.

As stated by the Court, Redd, supra, p. 5, the sole

issue for review is whether the lower court erred when it dismissed
at the preliminary hearing the charges against the Redds for abuse
or desecration of a dead human body.

The sole issue for this

Court, now, is whether the State has met its burden, under Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 35, in convincing this Court that
this newly raised issue, premised upon openly illegal addenda, was
so overlooked or misapprehended, that this Court should reverse its
unanimous ruling and, in turn, based upon this newly raised issue,
reverse the Trial Court.
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ARGUMENT
This Court should not reverse the Trial Court said its own
unanimous decision on the basis of an issue of alleged legislative
fact, raised, for the first time, in a Petition for Rehearing.
Contrary to the State's urging, ex post facto, the particular way
an archaeologist used a term of art, when he testified, is not
legislative fact.
The State opens its argument with the statement that this
Court affirmed the dismissal "because the State did not put on
proof

of

the

meaning

of

the

term

'midden1

as

used

by

the

archaeologist to describe the proximate location of the human bones
in the Anasazi archaeological site."

(Petition, p. 3.)

Factually,

the State's expert witness was never asked and never testified that
these were Anasazi ruins.

The appellate record, page 100, lines

17-23 show the site description.
A.

We - went to a site that's relatively typical
of that lower end of Cottonwood Wash. The site
itself consisted of a building that was about
30 feet across and sort of a north-to-south
access with a courtyard in front and a kiva
to the south, and east of that, a midden area
and there was a large rectangular hole that
had been - been dug into that midden, and the
resulting back dirt from that excavation was
piled in the immediate vicinity of the - if
the hole.

The State's own Petition, page 11, footnote 4, informs us
that:
Although less than 20% of San Juan County has
been inventoried, some 14,736 archaeological
sites have been identified and entered into an
electronic data base. Of the sites in the data
base, 59.2% are identified as Anasazi or Pueblo.
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Simple math shows that over 6,000 ruins in the electronic data base
in San Juan County are other than Anasazi - whether paleo, archaic,
basket-maker,
statistics.

or

historical,

is

unknown

from

the

State's

Just as this Court found that "(T)he State called no

witnesses, expert or otherwise, to establish that these bones were
intentionally deposited in the earth in a place of repose," neither
did the State's expert label this ruin an Anasazi or Pueblo, or
paleo, archaic, basket-maker, or historical.
The State

cannot, by mere

argument,

Redd, supra, p. 7.
on a Petition

for

Rehearing, supply testimony that was not given.
The next sub-argument by the State is an admission that not
only was this Court correct in having found that the State had not
sought judicial notice in the lower Court, but that the State, in
oral argument, when the issue of judicial notice was raised, failed
to mention either Utah Rules of Evidence 201 or this new issue of
an alleged legislative fact.

In State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145

(Utah App. 1997), the Court, page 149, quoting Limb v. Federated
Milk Producer's Ass'n., 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), at 293 n. 2, held
that "(T)he appellate court will affirm a judgment on grounds not
urged below, but will not reverse the lower court on errors claimed
for the first time on appeal."
There is a due process component which is violated by this
twelfth hour newly raised issue. To allow the State to selectively
focus on an issue it raised for the first time after the unanimous
appellate opinion is issued, while illegally appending a hodge
podge of excerpts which relate to areas other than this "site
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that's relatively typical of that lower end of Cottonwood Wash"
(R. 100, lines 17-18), is to give the defendants, originally
charged with a serious felony, no notice nor opportunity to fairly
respond, in view of the constraints of Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 24(11). The cliche about two wrongs not making one right
is apposite here.
record, without

The State's illegal efforts to modify the

a Utah R. App. P.,

Rule 11(h) motion, is

understandable in the face of clear law that such a motion cannot
be used to introduce new material in the record.
Craicr-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991).

Olson v. ParkHowever, the

defendants cannot, without joining the State's illegalities, append
articles showing that, even assuming this were to have been an
Anasazi area, which was not shown by the State, Pueblo II Anasazi
burials included burial pits and period pottery, that skulls and
bones were thrown into pits with other debris to level up the
depression before Pueblo II walls were built, that extensive
articles exist on Anasazi cannibalism with commensurate scattering
or mass dumping of remains, that toward the sunset of the Anasazi,
bodies were left or scattered, and that, in the case of the museum
in Blanding, a body was found in one of the dwellings.

In short,

the discipline of archaeology, like most, is not at all unanimous
regarding the place of intentional burials or that bones in middens
necessarily equate an intentional burial, without additional data.
Contrary to the State's position, the use of the word midden
does not describe a burial ground. The Court, at footnote 2 of its
opinion, Redd, supra, p. 7, finds "a midden area to be an area
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where refuse or garbage is piled."

Merriam

Webster's Collegiate

Dictionary, Tenth Edition, the book we send to college with our
youth, at page 736, defines "midden" first as "dunghill" and second
as

"a refuse heap;

esp: kitchen midden."

definition is given as "a small pile
leaves) gathered by a rodent

Lastly,

a

third

(as of seeds, bones, or

(as a pack rat)" emphasis added.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, at page
1429, is a bit more expansive but in line with this Court's
observations. Again, "midden" is first listed as "dunghill," then
"an accumulation of refuse about a dwelling place; a refuse heap,
kitchen midden, one of the masses of highly organic soil deposited
by an earthworm about its burrow; sometime organic debris left on
the soil by various other animals."
The State argues, inaccurately,

at

footnote

2, page 8,

"(r)egardless of the pending controversy, the definition of the
archaeological term of art "midden" will remain constant."

It

bases its argument on a fact not presented by their expert, that
this was an Anasazi ruin.
The

very

definition

of

universality of understanding.

legislative

facts

involves

a

Legislative facts "do not relate

specifically to the activities or characteristics of the litigants.
A Court generally relies upon legislative facts when it purports
to develop a particular law or policy and thus considers material
wholly unrelated to the activities of the parties." U.S. v. Gould.
536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976), at 220.
State defeats its position.

By its very argument, the

"In the context of the case before the
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Court, the recognition of the word "midden" within the Anasazi
culture as a usual burial place for Anasazi dead is a legislative
fact."

(Petition, p. 8.)

Yet "this Court, sitting in urban Salt

Lake City," does not understand "the full meaning of the term ..."
(Petition, p. 10.)
The State has the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue
because the "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent

authority

cited

and

is not

simply a

depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research."

Montova, supra, page 150, quoting from

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted);
accord Burns v. Summerhaup, 929 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 1996) and State
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992), for the fact that "this
court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are not
adequately briefed on appeal•"
Applying these principles, the Montova Court declined to
address the State's new arguments and, the defendants urge, this
Court should decline to address the State's new argument in the
instant case.
Nowhere does the State provide any legal authority that the
definition of a term of art, used in a particular testimony,
qualifies as legislative fact.

The State argues that a midden

should not be understood in the normal meaning, but rather "in the
context of the case before the Court," it was a "term of art" that
these three eminent "urban" jurists did not understand, and that,
despite a failure of the State to have their expert testify that
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this was an Anasazi site, the illegal appended articles, about
undefined or unrelated areas, supports their assertion that the
word "midden" is a usual burial place for Anasazi dead.

The very

stating of the special circumstances in their argument defeats the
argument•
The State's summary statement, that "sufficient evidence of
intentional interment was presented through the archaeologist's
testimony to support a bindover for trial in district court,"
(Petition, p. 12) refutes the exact unanimous findings of this
Court.

"The State called no witnesses, expert or otherwise, to

establish that these bones were intentionally deposited in the
earth in a place of repose."

This Court unanimously found that

"(T)he sole fact that bones are underground when found does not
raise a reasonable inference that the bones were intentionally
deposited in the earth for the purpose of placing them in repose."
Redd, supra, p. 7.

It is this Court's findings that reflect a

universality and common sense understanding of a host of possible
explanations for the presence of disparate bone fragments, in the
ground, some of which were listed in defendants' brief and in this
response•
The State has cast its lot in this completely newly raised
argument with the testimony of ics archaeologist.
12.)

(Petition p.

Mr. Davidson's testimony is in the record from page 99-104.

The word Anasazi never appears.
word burial or grave.

Never does the witness use the

Never does the witness describe particular

types of pottery shards found so as to date these fragments. Never
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does

the

witness

talk

intentional interment.

about

artifacts

consistent

with

an

The weight of the State's argument, they

admit, hangs on the use by the expert witness of the word "midden"
twice within one sentence on page 100, for he does not otherwise
use it in five pages of testimony. The witness never is asked and
never volunteers, or even hints at, some hidden, pregnant, wordof-art, definition.

Yet from this one sentence, from these two

words, with nothing more, the State asks this Court to ignore the
common definition and supplant it with that supplied, not by law,
but with illegally attached addenda.
The State cites no Utah Appellate Rules of Procedure but
violates them.
The State cites five cases at law.

The sole federal case is

U. S. v. Coffman, 638 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1980) . Coffman affirmed
the lower court. Coffman, at 195, cites U.S. v. Gould, supra, 219221, in saying that "Legislative facts are established truths,
facts, or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but
apply universally

..."

Here the State seeks not a universal

application of the meaning of midden but rather one restricted to
this particular

case,

the particular way

it was used by a

particular witness, as a "term-of -art.w
The State cites Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909
P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) . Cruz affirmed the lower court. The State's
citation is to a footnote in a concurring opinion, and references
to "the propriety of considering legislative facts in making policy
decisions."

"Stated another way, legislative facts are used to
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craft general rules of law, while adjudicative facts are used only
to decide the particular case on trial and not for a more general
purpose."

Cruz, supra, 1259 n. 1.

In Cruz, the statistics were

cited in plaintiff's brief and were argued to the court/ unlike the
instant case. In the instant case, contrary to the now cited law,
the State does not seek a universal application and does not seek
that this Court make a policy decision, but rather, by its own
words, relegates its request to that this Court "recognize that the
archaeologist used the term-of-art "midden" in a particular way
when he testified where he found the human remains."
p. 5.)

(Petition,

It focuses the Court "in the context of the case before the

Court."

(Petition p. 8.)

This Court's unanimous findings and the

common meaning of midden defy application of Cruz and legislative
facts to the instant case such as to support a reversal.
The State quotes this Court's findings in Redd, and seeks, by
a new theory, to reverse this Court and the Trial Court/ but gives
no case wherein judicial notice of legislative fact permitted
reversal.
The State cites Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch,
Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988) but shrugs it aside, "because
the Court is not being asked to take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact."

(Petition, p. 5.)

several holdings quite germane.

However, Trimble has

The first is that "Utah courts

have consistently followed a policy strongly opposed to the raising
of issues for the first time on appeal."

Trimble, supra 456,

citing Zion First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749
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P.2d 651 (Utah 1988) for the principle that this rule applies even
when facts are not disputed and the issue raised is one of law.
Trimble also, on page 456, footnote 4, points out that taking
notice for the first time on appeal is permissive if it is for
affirmance, but not reversal, as is here sought by the State.
Finally, the State cites State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986),

a case which reversed

a conviction

for admission of

unauthenticated documents and is the seminal Utah case on requiring
cautionary instruction in single eye-witness cases.

It adds

nothing to the issue of so late a raising of legislative fact being
the basis for a reversal.
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that
the "petition shall state with particularity the points of law or
fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or
misapprehended."

Implicit

in

this

common

understanding

of

"overlooked or misapprehended" is that the issue was raised at some
level. But it was not. This Court overlooked nothing.

The claim

that this "urban" Court did not understand the particular way a
term-of-art was used by a particular witness in the particular case
defies any meaning or understanding of legislative fact with its
mandated universal application.
permits

a

newly

raised

The State cites no law which

judicial

notice,

adjudicative

or

legislative, to be used to reverse the Trial Court or this Court.
The State cannot violate the Rules by illegally appending material;
cannot create evidence or inference from a vacuum; cannot by simply
saying Anasazi, attach it to their witness's testimony; cannot show
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over 6,000 San Juan Sites to not be Anasazi and fail to distinguish
this site, and cannot violate the defendants1 rights to due process
by so lately raising this issue, with no opportunity to refute
addenda

without

themselves

violating

Utah

Appellate

Rules

of

Procedure.
The State has failed, completely, in its burden under Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Respectfully submitted,
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